Using accumulated knowledge to calibrate theoretical propositions
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Using accumulated knowledge to calibrate theoretical propositions

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Abstract
In organizational psychology research, most theories put forth directional predictions, such as stating that an increase in one construct will result in an increase or decrease in another construct. Such predictions are imprecise, given that they can be confirmed by a wide range of values, and theories that rely on such predictions bear little risk of falsification. In this article, we present an approach for increasing theoretical precision by using results from meta-analyses to calibrate the predictions embedded in a theory. Our approach provides point values for theoretical predictions along with credibility intervals that capture the likely range of the predicted effects. We illustrate this approach by drawing from research on work engagement and calibrate the predictions represented by two conceptual models. Contributions and limitations of the proposed approach are discussed.

Keywords
Creativity & innovation, fit, statistics/methods

Advancements in organizational psychology research depend heavily on the development and application of strong theory. Much attention has been devoted to guidelines for developing theory (Campbell, 1990; Dubin, 1976; Ferris, Hochwater, & Buckley, 2012; Sutton & Staw, 1995; van Knippenberg, 2011; Webster & Starbuck, 1988; Weick, 1989; Whetten, 1989), and the field has established journals dedicated to publishing conceptual articles that advance theory, including the Academy of Management Review, Psychological Review, and Organizational Psychology Review. Moreover, developing theory is regarded as evidence of significant scholarly impact (Miner, 2003), characteristic of those who achieve great stature in the field (Smith & Hitt, 2014).
2005) and earn recognition for distinguished scientific contributions by associations such as the Academy of Management and the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology.

Guidelines for developing strong theory typically emphasize several key criteria. In particular, the constructs that constitute theories should be clearly defined and comprehensively cover the conceptual domain of the theory while maintaining reasonable parsimony. The relationships among theoretical constructs should be fully described, thereby establishing the causal structure of the theory. Boundary conditions should be established to delineate what the theory purports to predict and explain. The theory should be useful, contributing to the understanding of relevant and important phenomena. Perhaps most important, strong theory should explain the conceptual logic underlying the processes represented by the theory, such that the rationale of the theory is explicit and justified.

Although the foregoing criteria provide sound guidance for developing and evaluating theory, they do not address an important but overlooked feature of strong theory, which concerns the magnitude of the relationships among theoretical constructs. Most theories in organizational psychology and related fields contain propositions that merely state the expected direction of the relationship between constructs, such as whether an increase in one construct will cause an increase or decrease in another construct (Edwards & Berry, 2010; Gigerenzer, 1998; Meehl, 1990). Directional propositions provide a weak basis for theory testing, given that observing a nonzero effect in empirical research is virtually inevitable (Cohen, 1994; Murphy, 1990), and such effects are increasingly likely to register as statistically significant as studies implement stronger methods, such as larger sample sizes and more reliable measures (Meehl, 1967). More fundamentally, theories that stipulate directional propositions run afoul of the principle that, in order to be viable, theories must be falsifiable (Popper, 1959). As asserted by Rushton (cited in Platt, 1964, p. 349), “a theory that cannot be mortally endangered cannot be alive.” Although a directional prediction can be falsified by obtaining an effect in the opposite direction, the range of acceptance is wide, because any value that deviates from zero in the predicted direction qualifies as supporting evidence (Edwards & Berry, 2010; Meehl, 1967).

Theories that are limited to directional propositions represent a significant barrier to progress in organizational psychology research. Because such theories yield predictions that tend to evade falsification, they are rarely eliminated from consideration (Edwards & Berry, 2010; Meehl, 1990; Pfeffer, 1993). Moreover, the accumulation of knowledge generated by such theories represents little more than tallying the frequency with which an effect falls in the expected direction, as opposed to homing in on the magnitude of an effect. From an applied standpoint, findings from research based on theories that make directional predictions have limited value, because practitioners and policy makers can derive little value from statements along the lines that increasing $X$ will increase or decrease $Y$ to some unspecified degree. As observed by Tukey (1969, p. 86):

> The physical sciences have learned much by storing up amounts, not just directions. If, for example, elasticity had been confined to “When you pull on it, it gets longer!” Hooke’s law, the elastic limit, plasticity, and many other important topics could not have appeared.

Directional predictions are partners in crime with null hypothesis significance tests, which together create a mutually reinforcing cycle of imprecision. Although null hypothesis significance testing has been criticized for decades (e.g., Bakan, 1966; Carver, 1978; Cohen, 1994; Krueger, 2001; Nickerson, 2000; Rozeboom, 1960), its survival is partly due to the fact that most theories in organizational psychology simply predict deviations from the null in a positive or negative direction, which is
what null hypothesis tests are designed to detect. By drawing from theories that make such feeble predictions, there is little wonder that we continue to rely on statistical tests that repeatedly flog the null hypothesis, even when it can be declared dead on arrival (Cohen, 1994; Gigerenzer, 1998; Murphy, 1990).

One way to extricate ourselves from this vicious cycle is to develop theories that offer predictions that are more precise than directional statements (Edwards & Berry, 2010). The approach we examine in this article involves the development of propositions that articulate the expected range of the magnitude of each relationship among the variables in a theory, in the spirit of the “good-enough belt” advocated by Serlin and Lapsley (1985). Of the various ways to develop range predictions, one that holds particular promise is to draw from accumulated empirical evidence about relationships that are conceptually consistent with those in a theory under development. This evidence can be found in meta-analyses, which are pervasive in the organizational psychology literature. Although meta-analyses are typically used as little more than sources for summarizing an area of research or documenting the prevailing direction of an effect (Carlson & Ji, 2011), most contain information that can be used to calibrate the expected magnitude of a relationship indicated by a theoretical proposition. This information constitutes a vast untapped resource that can be leveraged to increase the precision of theoretical predictions. In this article, we discuss how results from meta-analyses can be used to calibrate theoretical predictions and provide an example that draws from published meta-analyses.

Using results from meta-analyses to calibrate theoretical predictions

Meta-analysis has become firmly established in organizational psychology research as the primary method for synthesizing quantitative findings from primary studies (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009; Cooper, Hedges, & Valentine, 2009; Raju, Burke, Normand, & Langlois, 1991; Schmidt & Hunter, 2014). In general, the goal of meta-analysis is to derive summary estimates of effect sizes along with intervals that describe the uncertainty of these estimates and the potential ranges the effects might display. These estimates can be corrected for various artifacts, such as sampling variability, measurement error, and range restriction, which tends to strengthen the correspondence between meta-analytic estimates and the population parameters they are intended to represent.

Various meta-analytic approaches have been developed to summarize effect sizes and derive their associated intervals. Typically, effect sizes are summarized by computing a weighted average of the effects found in primary studies, where the weights are the sample sizes of each study (Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Raju et al., 1991; Schmidt & Hunter, 2014) or within-study variance, which is itself an inverse function of sample size (Borenstein et al., 2009). Summary effect size estimates are usually accompanied by a confidence interval, which is derived from the standard error of the effect and thus captures the precision of the estimate (Borenstein et al., 2009; Raju et al., 1991; Schmidt & Hunter, 2014). All else being equal, the confidence interval around an effect size estimate decreases as the combined sample sizes of the primary studies increase. Confidence intervals should be distinguished from credibility intervals, which are derived from the standard deviation of the corrected effects and thus capture the variation of population effect size estimates after sampling variability has been removed (Whitener, 1990). Prediction intervals integrate the information contained in confidence and credibility intervals to indicate the expected range of an effect for the next study to be conducted, taking into account sampling variability as well as the range of population effect

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sizes (Borenstein et al., 2009; Higgins, Thompson, & Spiegelhalter, 2009).

Of the various statistics generated by meta-analysis, the most relevant for calibrating theoretical predictions are the summary effect and the credibility interval. The summary effect provides an unbiased estimate of the effect in the population, which can serve as a point value for a theoretical prediction. The credibility interval can be used to specify the range of a theoretical prediction around the point value and set its upper and lower bounds. Because these bounds are corrected for sampling variability, they are appropriate for calibrating predictions at the theoretical level, which refer to effects in the population designated by the theory independent of a particular sample drawn from that population. The summary effect and credibility interval may be corrected for artifacts that can bias estimates in primary studies, such as measurement error and range restriction, given that these artifacts affect empirical research and, in principle, do not exist at the theoretical level.

In some meta-analyses, the credibility interval for the summary effect is zero, meaning there is no variation in the effect. This situation characterizes fixed-effects meta-analysis, which is based on the assumption that a single population effect underlies the effects found in primary studies, which differ from one another only due to sampling variability (Borenstein et al., 2009; Hedges & Vevea, 1998; Schmidt & Hunter, 2014). When a credibility interval is zero, the summary effect can be used to specify a theoretical prediction represented as a single point value. Doing so does not imply that a hypothesis derived from the theory to be tested empirically should be stated as a point value, given that virtually any effect estimated in sample data will deviate from a prespecified point, even if by a very small amount (Cohen, 1994; Murphy, 1990). This deviation is accommodated by placing a prediction interval around the summary effect which, as noted earlier, specifies the expected range of an effect in sample randomly drawn from the population (Borenstein et al., 2009; Higgins et al., 2009). A prediction interval around a hypothesized point value is consistent with the good-enough belt advocated by Serlin and Lapsley (1985), which specifies the range within which effects are expected to fall in empirical research. When a credibility interval is nonzero, its corresponding prediction interval is wider because it takes sampling variability into account (Borenstein et al., 2009). Because our goal is to calibrate theoretical predictions, we focus on credibility intervals while noting that prediction intervals should be used in studies designed to test the predictions of a theory.

An illustrative example

To demonstrate the use of summary effects and credibility intervals to calibrate theoretical predictions, we consider research on work engagement, which refers to the investment of personal energy in the experience or performance of work (Christian, Garza, & Slaughter, 2011; Kahn, 1990; Macey & Schneider, 2008; Rich, LePine, & Crawford, 2010; Schaufeli, Salanova, Gonzalez-Roma, & Bakker, 2002). This research suggests that work engagement is influenced by various individual and situational factors and, in turn, affects outcomes such as job-related attitudes and performance. For this illustration, we focus on five constructs: task significance, transformational leadership, conscientiousness, work engagement, and task performance. We specify the relationships among these constructs using two conceptual models, one in which the effects of task significance, transformational leadership, and conscientiousness on task performance are fully mediated by work engagement, and another in which these effects are partially mediated by work engagement (see Figure 1).

To calibrate the predictions in these theoretical models, we draw from a meta-analysis
conducted by Christian et al. (2011) using the approach developed by Raju et al. (1991). We used information collected for this meta-analysis to derive population estimates of the correlations among the five constructs of interest, computed as the sample-size weighted means of the correlations from the primary studies (see Table 1). We corrected the correlations from the primary studies for measurement error individually for each study, which takes into account the sampling variability of the reliability estimates used (Burke & Landis, 2003). We also computed 80% credibility intervals, as shown in Table 1. We used intervals of this width in accordance with conventions in meta-analysis, although intervals that are narrower or wider can be used, which would respectively increase or decrease the precision of the associated theoretical propositions. All credibility intervals were nonzero, ranging in width from 0.16 to 0.42. The total sample sizes for the mean correlations and associated credibility intervals ranged from 777 to 12,893 with a harmonic mean of 2,701.

If the predictions specified by a theory were limited to simple bivariate associations, then the point values and intervals in Table 1 could be used for calibration purposes. However,
most theories specify causal relationships among multiple constructs, such as those depicted by the models in Figure 1. For such theories, predictions should be calibrated not based on bivariate associations, but instead using partialed relationships that are consistent with the structure of the theory. For instance, according to the models in Figure 1, the effect of task significance on work engagement should be calibrated not using the correlation of .51 and credibility interval of (.43, .59) in Table 1, but instead using information that takes into account the correlation of task significance with transformational leadership and conscientiousness along with the effects of these two constructs on work engagement. To obtain this information, the mean correlations and credibility intervals in Table 1 were used as input into structural equation models specified according to the two models in Figure 1. We used this approach not to empirically test the models, but instead to compute the coefficients used to calibrate the paths of the models.

Point values for calibrating the theoretical relationships were generated by estimating models that used the mean correlations in Table 1 as input. Credibility intervals for the relationships were derived by sequentially replacing each mean correlation with the lower and upper bounds of its credibility interval, leaving the remaining mean correlations at their point values. This approach was based on the principle that the credibility interval for each mean correlation is at its widest when the other correlations are at their means. This principle is illustrated by the graph in Figure 2. The axes labeled \( \rho_{12} \) and \( \rho_{13} \) represent two population correlations, the average values on each axis are the summary effects, and the lower and upper bounds of the credibility intervals of the correlations are labeled \( L\rho_{12} \) and \( U\rho_{12} \) for \( \rho_{12} \) and \( L\rho_{13} \) and \( U\rho_{13} \) for \( \rho_{13} \). The ellipse signifies the credibility region of \( \rho_{12} \) and \( \rho_{13} \) considered jointly and is slanted to represent the general case in which \( \rho_{12} \) and \( \rho_{13} \) are not independent. The solid lines crossing the ellipse correspond to the credibility intervals of \( \rho_{12} \) and \( \rho_{13} \), and the dashed lines run parallel to the solid lines. When

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Task significance</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Transformational leadership</td>
<td>0.29 (.21, .37)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Conscientiousness</td>
<td>0.15 (.06, .24)</td>
<td>0.07 (-.02, .16)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Work engagement</td>
<td>0.51 (.43, .59)</td>
<td>0.27 (.19, .35)</td>
<td>0.42 (.30, .54)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Task performance</td>
<td>0.23 (.02, .44)</td>
<td>0.20 (.12, .28)</td>
<td>0.23 (.10, .36)</td>
<td>0.39 (.27, .51)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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Note. \( H = 2701 \) (\( H \) refers to the harmonic mean). All correlations are corrected for measurement error and range restriction. The numbers in parentheses below each correlation are the lower and upper bounds of the 80% credibility interval.
projected onto the axes, the dashed lines show that, for each correlation, the width of each credibility interval depends on the level of the other correlation. For instance, the horizontal lines show that the credibility interval for $r_{12}$ becomes narrower as $r_{13}$ deviates from its mean, given that each dashed line is shorter than the solid line. This principle also holds for the credibility interval of $r_{13}$, as can be seen by comparing the lengths of the solid and dashed vertical lines. The mathematical basis for this principle rests on the fact that, for any set of parallel chords crossing an ellipse, the longest chord is the diameter, which passes through the center of the ellipse.\(^1\) This principle generalizes to higher dimensions, such as the 10-dimensional space corresponding to the 10 mean correlations in Table 1, and it holds regardless of whether the mean correlations are dependent or independent. Replacing the point value of each mean correlation with the lower and upper bounds of its credibility interval yielded 20 correlation matrices, which were used as input to compute paths for the models in Figure 1. From these results, we identified the minimum and maximum values of each path and used them as the lower and upper bounds, respectively, of the relationships in the two models.

The calibrated relationships for the models in Figure 1 are provided in Table 2. For the complete mediation model, the point values of the effects of task significance, transformational leadership, and conscientiousness on work engagement were 0.42, 0.12, and 0.35, respectively. These values are lower than the corresponding mean correlations in Table 1, which can be attributed to the fact that the results in Table 2 are partialed rather than bivariate relationships. The sizes of the credibility intervals for the effects were 0.18, 0.17, and 0.24, respectively, which are similar to those for the mean correlations in Table 1. The point value and credibility interval for the effect of work engagement on task performance is the same as those for the mean correlation in Table 1, given that the complete mediation model depicts this relationship as a bivariate association from which no other effects are partialed.

For the partial mediation model, the point values and credibility intervals for the effects of task significance, transformational leadership, and conscientiousness on work engagement are the same as those for the complete mediation model, given that both models specify these effects in the same manner (i.e., these three constructs are the causes of work engagement).

### Table 2. Point estimates and bounds for complete and partial mediation models.

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<th>Complete mediation model</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Point value</td>
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<tr>
<td>Task significance</td>
<td>Work engagement</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transformational leadership</td>
<td>Work engagement</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscientiousness</td>
<td>Work engagement</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work engagement</td>
<td>Task performance</td>
<td>0.39</td>
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<th>Partial mediation model</th>
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<td>Point value</td>
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<td>Task significance</td>
<td>Work engagement</td>
<td>0.42</td>
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<td>Transformational leadership</td>
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<td>0.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conscientiousness</td>
<td>Work engagement</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task significance</td>
<td>Task performance</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transformational leadership</td>
<td>Task performance</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conscientiousness</td>
<td>Task performance</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work engagement</td>
<td>Task performance</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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**Note.** Table entries are standardized paths for the models shown in Figure 1.
However, with the partial mediation model, work engagement is now accompanied by task significance, transformational leadership, and conscientiousness as causes of task performance. The point value for the effect of work engagement on task performance decreased slightly from 0.39 to 0.31, and the width of the credibility interval became increased from 0.24 to 0.40. The point values of the effects of task significance, transformational leadership, and conscientiousness on task performance were small, ranging from 0.03 to 0.10, and their credibility intervals ranged in width from 0.18 to 0.59. Across both models, the credibility intervals for all but two paths excluded zero, and both of these paths were less than 0.10 in magnitude.

Discussion

Developing theories with propositions that are more precise than mere directional statements promises to enhance theoretical progress in organizational psychology research. In this article, we have presented an approach to increasing the precision of theoretical propositions by drawing from quantitative summaries of effect sizes and credibility intervals available in meta-analyses, which provide a vast untapped resource for calibrating theoretical predictions. We used this approach to calibrate predictions for two conceptual models that involve the causes and outcomes of work engagement. Our approach incorporated mean correlations and credibility intervals with the causal structures of the models to specify the magnitudes of the predictions embedded in these models and the lower and upper bounds of these predictions. The approach we presented can be used to calibrate theoretical predictions in other conceptual domains that involve different constructs and pose alternative causal models.

Although the approach presented here bears some similarity to meta-analytic structural equation modeling (Cheung & Chan, 2005; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995), our approach is not intended to test models, but instead is designed to calibrate theoretical predictions to be tested in subsequent empirical research. As noted earlier, our application of structural equation modeling was merely a convenient technique to compute point values and credibility intervals for the relationships specified by a theory. Because this type of application is a computational shortcut rather than an empirical test, we are not concerned with model fit, tests of parameter estimates, and other issues that merit attention in conventional applications of structural equation modeling.

Although our approach is designed to calibrate relationships in theoretical models, it can be modified to specify point values and ranges for predictions to be tested in empirical studies. This can be accomplished by replacing the credibility intervals used in our approach with prediction intervals which, as noted earlier, provide the expected range of effect sizes for the next empirical study, taking into account the variability of population effect sizes and variance due to sampling error (Borenstein et al., 2009; Higgins et al., 2009). Because prediction intervals incorporate both of these sources of variation, they are wider than either confidence intervals or credibility intervals. For our illustrative examples, the 80% prediction intervals for the mean correlations in Table 1 were only slightly wider than the 80% credibility intervals, with an average increase in width of 0.02. The bounds of prediction intervals can be used to derive the expected range of empirical relationships using the procedure we demonstrated to obtain bounds of the theoretical relationships for the models in our example. The obtained prediction intervals can be compared to empirical results using procedures for testing range hypotheses (Nickerson, 2000; Serlin & Lapsley, 1985).

Admittedly, the approach presented here has several limitations. First, it requires meta-analytic evidence that is relevant to the theory under development. As such, researchers should
carefully evaluate the correspondence between the sampling, method, and design of the primary studies and the substance of the theoretical model under development (Cooper, 2010). For theories that strive for novelty, it might be difficult to locate meta-analyses that provide results needed to calibrate theoretical predictions. In such cases, researchers might resort to meta-analyses that involve constructs that are conceptually similar to those in the focal theory, acknowledging that the calibrated predictions likely represent rough approximations. Second, our illustration represented population effect sizes as correlations. When used as input for structural equation models, correlation matrices can implicitly modify the model being analyzed, a problem that is avoided by using covariance matrices (Cudeck, 1989). Nonetheless, correlations provide a convenient metric for quantifying effect sizes when the studies involved measure variables on different scales, as is generally the case in meta-analysis. On balance, we believe that correlations provide a reasonable basis for calibrating theoretical predictions, although we recognize that other metrics for quantifying effect sizes can be used (Babakus & Ferguson, 1988; Cortina & Nouri, 2000; Grissom & Kim, 2005; Liebetrau, 1983). Third, the correlations derived from meta-analyses involve samples drawn from different studies, and the resulting correlation matrices might not be positive definite, which can yield aberrant results such as $R^2$ values that exceed unity. Moreover, the primary studies might involve samples that differ in substantive respects, which would undermine the treatment of the correlations as a unified set. This limitation applies to meta-analytic structural equation modeling in general, as opposed to our approach in particular, but it nonetheless merits attention.

We should add that theoretical propositions calibrated using our approach are only as valid as the primary studies used for meta-analyses and the methods used to conduct these analyses. Although meta-analysis can address some shortcomings of primary studies, such as measurement error and range restriction, many types of methodological flaws are not remedied when primary studies are combined using meta-analysis (Aguinis, Pierce, Bosco, Dalton, & Dalton, 2011; Eysenck, 1978; Sharpe, 1997). In addition, meta-analysis relies on statistical assumptions, such as whether effects are fixed or random (Hedges & Vevea, 1998) and the notion that random effects are normally distributed (Higgins et al., 2009; Kraemer & Andrews, 1982), which can be violated in practice. Moreover, meta-analysis requires numerous judgment calls (Wanous, Sullivan, & Malinak, 1989), although the effects of these decisions on effect size estimates are apparently less than generally believed (Aguinis, Dalton, Bosco, Pierce, & Dalton, 2011). These and other factors that impact the results of meta-analyses should be carefully evaluated as a precursor to using these results to calibrate theoretical propositions.

We acknowledge that our approach might engender skepticism among organizational psychology researchers. The premise of calibrating theoretical predictions could be viewed as assuming a level of precision that cannot be achieved in psychology, given the nature of the phenomena under study. However, researchers implicitly calibrate an effect size when they designate it as small, medium, or large (Cohen, 1992) or evaluate the practical significance of an effect (Kirk, 1996). Moreover, the primary purpose of meta-analysis is to calibrate effect sizes and gauge their uncertainty and potential ranges, and there is no shortage of meta-analyses in the organizational psychology literature. With regard to calibrating theoretical predictions, the primary question is not whether we have the required information, but whether we will choose to use that information to make our theories more precise.

Finally, the approach outlined here should be considered one of several ways to increase the precision of theoretical propositions (Edwards & Berry, 2010). Other approaches rely on the conceptual reasoning used to explain the relationships
in a theory. For instance, when a proposition is supported by several distinct theoretical arguments that supplement one another, it is reasonable to predict that associated effect will be stronger than an effect that is based on a single theoretical rationale. In addition, when a proposition refers to a relationship between constructs that are causally proximal rather than distal, then the relationship is likely to be relatively strong, because distal relationships effectively operate through mediating mechanisms that dampen the magnitude of the relationship. This reasoning is manifested in a conceptual model of workplace safety presented by Christian, Bradley, Wallace, and Burke (2009), in which distal person and situation factors (e.g., personality, climate) influenced proximal person factors (e.g., safety motivation and knowledge), which in turn affected safety performance. Their meta-analysis supported the prediction that proximal factors have larger effects than factors that are conceptually more distal from safety performance. Theoretical propositions can also be informed by practical considerations, which can be used to stipulate the range of effect sizes that would be considered meaningful and useful (Fowler, 1985; Kirk, 1996). Thus, we encourage researchers to draw from empirical, conceptual, and practical approaches to increase the precision of theoretical propositions. Doing so would help us move beyond directional predictions that say little more than whether we expect to fall off a log to the left or the right. Taking these steps to increase theoretical precision can greatly enhance the accumulation of knowledge in organizational psychology research.

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Note
1. We are indebted to Barry Cipra for explaining the rationale for this principle to us.

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stage approach. Psychological Methods, 10, 40–64.


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